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Economic Perspective 4 
THE THATCHER GOVERNMEIT'S ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY - MUST HfTERVENTIOM BE PRECLUDED ? 
Frank H Stephen 
Department of Economics 
University of Strathclyde 
The present Government's approach to 
economic policy i s radical ly different 
from t h a t of any o ther post-war UK 
government. The difference i s not simply 
that the government wishes to reduce the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
(PSBR); or control the money supply; or 
pr iva t i se nationalised indus t r ies ; or 
reduce regulation. These pol ic ies have 
been espoused by previous governments. 
What i s different i s the single-minded way 
in which the present government pursues 
t h i s policy package: a single mindedness 
which borders on religious fervour. 
The present government's economic policies 
are founded on an ideology which accords 
the market a pivotal ro le in ensuring 
economic and p o l i t i c a l freedom. This 
perspective spe l l s out th i s underlying 
ideology and assesses i t s va l id i ty . To 
t h i s end a crucial d i s t inc t ion must be 
drawn between market prices as a source of 
private incentives and as a measure of 
s o c i a l v a l u a t i o n . The i m p l i c i t 
presumption of the government i s that 
these are one and the same. "Pricing 
themselves out of the market" and 
" u n e c o n o m i c " t h u s become moral 
imprecations. This i s the fundamental 
source of conflict between the government 
and a number of prominent r e l i g i o u s 
leaders. The l a t t e r do not share t h i s 
moral position. 
The recent statement by Mr John Gummer 
that bishops can no more pontif icate on 
economics than the Pope could correct 
Galileo on physics t o t a l l y misses the 
point. Economics i s not physics: i t has 
no universal laws or empirical constants. 
Economic policy must ultimately be based 
on ethical or moral statements about what 
ought to be done. 
What then i s the government's ideology ? 
I t i s basically that of nineteenty century 
l iberal ism which emphasises the position 
of the individual in society. Freedom i s 
defined as the absence of coercion. The 
allocation of resources via the market, i t 
i s a r g u e d , m i n i m i s e s c o e r c i o n . 
Governments are by the i r nature coercive 
since they are only needed if someone i s 
to made to do something which he would not 
do voluntarily. Consequently, government 
i s a necessary evi l whose role must be 
minimised. 
This c lass ica l l i be ra l ideology has been 
resurrected in the l a s t forty years by a 
number of wr i te rs in economics and the 
o t h e r s o c i a l s c i e n c e s . The most 
in f luen t ia l of these has been F. A. Hayek 
whose w r i t i n g and ideas have been 
popular i sed through the pro-market 
I n s t i t u t e of Economic Affa i r s . His 
thinking has clearly influenced a number 
of sen ior Conservat ive p o l i t i c i a n s , 
including the present Prime Minister. 
The label "monetarist" i s often attached 
to t h i s government. However, i t s 
monetarism i s at best a secondary part of 
i t s policy package: a t a c t i c a l means of 
dealing with the short-term problem of 
in f la t ion , but one which has the added 
ideological advantage of being consistent 
with reducing the role of government. I t 
i s s i g n i f i c a n t in t h i s regard t h a t 
"control of the money supply" has been 
superceded in the o f f i c i a l l i tany by 
"reducion of the PSBR" as the main focus 
of economic management. Reduction of the 
PSBR imp l i e s cons t ra in ing the public 
sector , one of the a r t i c l e s of fa i th of 
the l iberal economic ideology. 
The government's attitude to trade unions 
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also derives from i t s economic liberalism 
rather than from monetarism. Milton 
Friedman, one of the most prominent 
advocates of monetarism, has consistently 
argued that unions cannot cause inflation. 
Unless a government faci l i ta tes inflation 
through slack monetary control , unions, 
according to monetarists, can only bid up 
the wages of their members at the expense 
of other workers. In such a framework, 
control of the money supply i s therefore 
sufficient to control inflation. Clearly, 
s u c c e s s i v e p i e c e s of t r a d e union 
legislation bear witness to the fact that 
t h i s view i s not espoused by the 
government. Unions are seen as a source of 
monopolistic power in the labour market 
and an i l l i b e r a l fo rce in soc ie ty 
restricting the freedom of the individual. 
Therefore, unions must be constrained. 
The economic liberal sees the market as an 
institution which can co-ordinate economic 
a c t i v i t y wi thout coercion because i t 
provides incentives to individuals to act 
in t he i r own and socie ty ' s i n t e r e s t s . 
Hayek has w r i t t e n e loquen t ly of the 
markets a b i l i t y to co-ordinate behaviour 
without coercion. I t i s an ef f ic ient 
mechanism for t ransmit t ing information 
about changing economic circumstances, a 
mechanism which operates with no master 
plan but with each individual reacting to 
signals (in the form of prices) about 
which resources are scarce and where 
profits are to be made. 
Entrepreneurs exist by searching out such 
profi table opportuni t ies . In so doing 
they perform the function of direct ing 
resources to t he i r highest-priced use. 
Resources in low-priced uses are attracted 
to these h i g h e r - p r i c e d uses by the 
entrepreneur's a b i l i t y to pay a higher 
price for them and s t i l l r e t a in a prof i t . 
Thus Smith's Invisible Hand i s the outcome 
of the independent decision of a large 
numbers of entrepreneurs. Prices in t h i s 
scheme of things provide economic agents 
with a great deal of information, but in a 
highly compact form. I t would be 
imposs ib le for the c o n t r o l l e r s of a 
centrally planned economy to generate the 
amount of information contained in an 
economy's relative prices. 
But i s t h i s how markets actual ly operate 
in the rea l world? For one thing, i t 
presumes that businessmen are always 
correct in the i r judgement of where the 
opportunity for prof i t l i e s . This i s 
patently fa lse , mistakes are often made 
w i t h consequences not only fo r 
businessmen. For another, i t supposes 
that a l l economic activity is motivated by 
entrepreneurship. But entrepreneurship 
i s rea l ly only relevant a t the margin of 
economic a c t i v i t y . Most economic 
activity i s routine in nature and does not 
involve businessmen but bureaucrats - not 
civil service bureaucrats but managers of 
l a r g e economic o r g a n i s a t i o n s , both 
publicly and privately owned. 
I t has been observed by one Harvard 
economic h i s t o r i a n t h a t the roo t of 
Br i ta in ' s economic problems and lack of 
competitiveness l i e s in our inability to 
come to terms with the change in the 
nature of the economic system which began 
towards the end of the last century - the 
replacement of competitive capitalism by 
managerial capitalism. British industry 
has lagged behind i t s American and West 
German counterparts in the organisational 
innovations associated with the evolution 
of the modern corporation. On th i s 
argument the return to Victorian virtues 
advocated by the Prime Minister not only 
will not guarantee economic success today; 
i t did not provide them the f i r s t time 
round! In the present context what i s 
most relevant i s that a not insubstantial 
proportion of decisions re la t ing to the 
allocation of resources are not mediated 
by the market (eg ac ross a g roce r ' s 
counter) but by administrat ive decision 
(eg from one part of a multinational 
corporation to another). Consequently, 
the role of prices in allocating resources 
i s reduced. 
Furthermore, the government's vision i s of 
a competitive market but ignores, or plays 
down, the ex i s t ence of monopol is t ic 
elements which distort the signals passing 
through the system. This applies whether 
the monopolistic element i s owned by the 
State (eg nationalised industries) or by 
sha reho lde r s . If an indus t ry i s 
monopolised other businessmen will not be 
able to compete away i t s excessive profits 
because of some barrier to their entry to 
tha t market. But the story does not end 
here . A l o g i c a l co ro l l a ry of the 
government's conception of the market 
system is that a distortion in one part of 
the system must distort the signals being 
transmitted to other parts of the system. 
Under such circumstances the market system 
becomes a highly efficient mechanism for 
transmitting distorted information. 
But even if all of the previously noted 
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sources of market imperfection are ignored 
and i t i s assumed that markets perform 
the i r function more or l ess e f f i c ien t ly , 
p r i c e s s t i l l a r e not u n q u a l i f i e d 
indicators of social value. Consider a 
market economy in which a l l wealth and 
property r i g h t s ( including r igh ts to 
employment) were approximately equally 
divided among the members of that society. 
This d i s t r ibu t ion of the command over 
resources (ie the money votes which 
determine prices) would produce one set of 
pr ices . If the same economy with the 
same population (and the same t a s t e s and 
preferences) had a radical ly different 
d is t r ibut ion of wealth and property, say 
giving 10% of the population 50% of the 
wealth, the d is t r ibu t ion of the command 
over resources would d i f f e r and a 
different set of p r i c e s would a r i s e . 
Relative prices are a function of the 
distribution of income and wealth. Only 
if the exist ing d i s t r ibu t ion has some 
moral significance can prices indicate 
social value. I t i s on this fundamental 
t ruth that the case for a government's 
role in the economy rests. 
However, the argument should not be taken 
to i t s reducto ad absurdun and the 
conclusion reached that prices do not 
matter and tha t a l l decisions about the 
allocation of resources should be made by 
p o l i t i c i a n s or some other group in 
society. That i s the route to chaos or 
totalitarianism. The market must remain 
the principal source of private incentive 
and the t r ansmiss ion mechanism for 
economic information, with governments 
mitigating the excesses which the market 
may produce - such as l a r g e s ca l e 
unemployment and the deaths of communities 
- which ar ise from the absence of smooth 
adjustments or historical accident. 
This i s not to say tha t the government 
should intervene to stop changes in demand 
from being r e f l e c t e d in employment 
patterns. What i t requires i s government 
i n t e r v e n t i o n t o e n s u r e t h a t such 
adjustments take place smoothly and with 
minimum hardship and d i s r u p t i o n to 
society. Such intervention night take 
the form of cushioning those involved in 
an industry which i s in decline through 
l imited subsidy. Such a subsidy should 
not be seen as permanent but directed to 
the gradual switch of employment away from 
that industry over a clear and r e a l i s t i c 
timescale. 
An a l t e r n a t i v e to subs id i s ing the 
dec l in ing indus t ry i s t o subs id i se 
replacement indus t r ies in areas where a 
declining industry i s particularly heavily 
concen t ra ted . This encourages the 
movement out of the declining industry by 
making i t more acceptable. I t also has 
the advantage of making i t clear that 
adjustment is going to take place. Hopes 
that the declining employment might be 
subsidised permanently are not encouraged. 
Adjustment wil l , of course, be smoothest 
in conditions of buoyant demand and ful l 
employment during which the declining 
industries will be those unable to compete 
for labour. High unemployment makes 
adjustment more difficult because for many 
people i t means the only direction of 
adjustment can be downwards. Under such 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s 
responsibi l i ty to smooth the adjustment 
process cannot be denied. 
